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Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Advance Access published online on June 17, 2009

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, doi:10.1093/scan/nsp021
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Neural correlates of observing pretend play in which one object is represented as another

Charles Whitehead1, Jennifer L. Marchant2, David Craik3 and Chris D. Frith2,4

1Cognitive Anthropology, University of Westminster,2Wellcome Centre for Neuroimaging, University College,3International School of Screen Acting, London, UK and 4Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark

Observers were scanned while they watched a video of an actor using an object. Three conditions were contrasted in which the same object was used: (i) normally (e.g. using a tennis racket to hit a ball), (ii) in an unusual way (e.g. using a tennis racket to strain spaghetti), (iii) in a pretend play (e.g. playing a tennis racket like a banjo). Observing real and unusual uses of objects activated areas previously seen in studies of tool use including areas associated with a mirror system for action. Observing pretend play activated additional areas previously associated with theory of mind tasks and listening to narrative, including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles. After presentation of each video, observers were asked to name the object as used in the preceding action video (e.g. racket, sieve or banjo). Naming the pretend object elicited activity in medial prefrontal cortex. These results are consistent with proposals that pretend play is a form of communicative narrative, associated with the ability to mentalize. However, this leaves open the question as to whether pretence or mentalizing is the more basic process.

Keywords: pretence; mirror neurons; theory of mind; narrative; medial prefrontal cortex



Correspondence should be addressed to Chris Frith, Wellcome Centre for Neuroimaging at UCL, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK. E-mail: cfrith{at}fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk

C.D.F. and J.L.M. are supported by the Wellcome Trust. C.D.F. is also supported by the Danish National Research Foundation and Arts and Humanities Research Council. The authors are grateful to Knut Kampe with whom the idea for the experimental paradigm was originally developed.

Received December 8, 2008. Accepted May 22, 2009.


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